Windfalls? Costs and benefits of investment tax incentives due to financial constraints
Windfalls? Costs and benefits of investment tax incentives due to financial constraints
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102469
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发表时间：
2023-08
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Masanori Orihara;Takafumi Suzuki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masanori Orihara;Takafumi Suzuki
我们发现，财务不受约束的公司比财务受约束的公司更频繁地要求临时投资税收优惠。值得注意的是，这些来自不受约束的公司的广泛索赔不会导致总投资超过索赔前水平的增量；相反，这些公司似乎将减税视为一笔意外之财，在随后的几年里增加了现金持有量。相比之下，受约束的公司在设法申请税收优惠时，相对于申请前的水平增加了投资。我们的分析来自日本2014年的税制改革，该改革引入了投资税收抵免和奖金折旧，实施时间近三年。我们使用了一项专有的纳税申报表调查，该调查提供了公共和私营公司税收激励索赔的数据。我们的研究结果强调了投资税收优惠的一种新的权衡：虽然在要求税收优惠的同时刺激了财务受限的公司的投资，但它们也不成比例地将税收优惠分配给了不受约束的公司，不一定会产生预期的投资刺激。
We find that financially unconstrained firms claim temporary investment tax incentives more frequently than their constrained counterparts. Notably, these extensive claims from unconstrained firms do not lead to an incremental total investment beyond pre-claim levels; instead, these firms appear to treat the tax cut as a windfall, increasing their cash holdings in subsequent years. In contrast, constrained firms increase their investments relative to pre-claim levels when they manage to claim tax incentives. Our analysis draws from a 2014 tax reform in Japan which introduced both an investment tax credit and bonus depreciation, available for nearly three years. We use a proprietary tax return survey that provides data on tax incentive claims across both public and private firms. Our findings highlight a novel tradeoff of investment tax incentives: while stimulating investments among financially constrained firms upon claiming tax incentives, they also disproportionately allocate tax benefits to unconstrained firms, not necessarily resulting in the intended investment stimulation.