Bicameral Politics in the European Union
Bicameral Politics in the European Union
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欧盟的两院政治
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Bjørn Høyland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sara Hagemann;Bjørn Høyland
关于欧盟立法决策和谈判的文献得出了一个共同的结论，即欧洲议会（Parliament）和欧盟理事会（理事会）在主要立法程序--共同决策程序中处于平等地位。我们目前的理论和经验证据表明，这是不是这样的。首先，我们对正式规则的分析表明，理事会拥有有条件的立法权，因为议会从一读到二读阅读通过立法的多数门槛发生了变化。这一变化对议会的内部动态及其相对于理事会的机构权力具有重要影响。测试这些分析考虑的正式决策规则对投票数据的所有共同决定立法通过的两个机构之间的1999年和2004年，我们的实证研究结果表明：第一，从1999年至2004年联盟的形成在理事会下降主要是沿着传统的左，右政治层面的谈判共同决定的建议。第二，当理事会对立法存在分歧时，在议会中也会出现严重分歧。第三，当议会按沿着政治路线划分时，就不太可能达到修正理事会通过的提案的绝对多数要求。最后，如果与理事会中主要意识形态突发事件有关的党派要求通过表决作出决定，议会修正案最有可能获得通过。
The literature on legislative decision-making and bargaining in the EU has reached a common conclusion that the European Parliament (Parliament) and the Council of the European Union (Council) are on an equal footing in the main legislative procedure, the co-decision procedure. We present theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that this is not the case. First, our analysis of the formal rules reveals that the Council has conditional agenda-setting power due to a change in the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament. This change has important implications for the internal dynamics of the Parliament and its institutional powers vis-a-vis the Council. Testing these analytical considerations of the formal decision rules against voting data on all co-decision legislation adopted in the two institutions between 1999 and 2004, our empirical findings show that: first, from 1999 to 2004 coalition formation in the Council fell predominantly along the traditional left–right political dimensions when negotiating co-decision proposals. Second, when disagreement over legislation is recorded in the Council, a strong divide can also be found in the Parliament. Third, when the Parliament is divided along party political lines, it is less likely to be able to meet the absolute majority requirement for amending the proposal adopted by the Council. Lastly, Parliament amendments are most likely to be adopted when a decision by voting is requested by a party group associated with the main ideological contingency in the Council.