Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections
Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections
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股东提案和解和公开选举的私人订购
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Sarah C. Haan
中科院分区：
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作者：
Sarah C. Haan
竞选财务披露的改革在国会和各联邦机构都陷入了停滞，但它正在一个公司接一个公司的私人订购计划中稳步展开。如今，公众对上市公司如何花钱影响联邦、州和地方选举的了解--尤其是对公司“黑钱”的了解--大多来自于遵守私下谈判合同的披露。这种新透明度的主要机制是股东提案的解决，在这种情况下，股东根据证券交易委员会规则14 a-8交易其权利-以及其他股东的潜在权利-以换取公司管理层私下协商的社会政策承诺。竞选财务披露提案的解决方案已在详细的私人协议中得到纪念，这些协议规定了披露报告的频率，格式和内容，由私人行为者执行，通常不提供给其他股东，公司利益相关者或公众。提案和解正在产生一套私人披露法，提高公司透明度，以推进第一修正案的价值，并免受第一修正案的审查。私人披露标准本身是一个混合的袋子：有效地填补了公共竞选财务披露法律的一些空白，但不足以使公司选举支出在选举前透明，作为一种私人选举监管形式，提案解决机制提出了民主透明度，参与，问责制和执行问题。这篇文章的特点提出了挑战的建议和解为“自愿”的公司自我监管，提供了一个框架，了解结算相关的代理成本，并显示如何解决颠覆了传统的理由，股东提案本身。解决定居点的民主和公司治理问题的解决方案在很大程度上是重叠的，这表明了一条前进的道路。
Reform of campaign finance disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various federal agencies, but it is steadily unfolding in a firm-by-firm program of private ordering. Today, much of what is publicly known about how individual public companies spend money to influence federal, state, and local elections – and particularly what is known about corporate “dark money” – comes from disclosures that conform to privately-negotiated contracts.The primary mechanism for this new transparency is the settlement of the shareholder proposal, in which a shareholder trades its rights under SEC Rule 14a-8 – and potentially the rights of other shareholders – for a privately-negotiated social policy commitment by corporate management. Settlements of campaign finance disclosure proposals have been memorialized in detailed private agreements that set the frequency, format, and substance of disclosure reports, are enforced by private actors, and typically are not available to other shareholders, corporate stakeholders, or the public. Proposal settlements are producing a body of private disclosure law that increases corporate transparency to advance First Amendment values, and is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. The private disclosure standards themselves are a mixed bag: effective at filling some gaps in public campaign finance disclosure law, but inadequate to make corporate electoral spending transparent in advance of elections.As a form of private electoral regulation, the proposal settlement mechanism raises issues of democratic transparency, participation, accountability, and enforcement. This Article challenges the characterization of proposal settlements as “voluntary” corporate self-regulation, provides a framework for understanding settlement-related agency costs, and shows how settlement subverts the traditional justifications for the shareholder proposal itself. Solutions that address the democratic and corporate governance problems of settlement largely overlap, suggesting a path forward.