Is belief reasoning automatic?
Is belief reasoning automatic?
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01791.x
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发表时间：
2006-10-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Samson, Dana
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Apperly, Ian A.;Riggs, Kevin J.;Samson, Dana
理解心理理论的操作特征对于理解信念、欲望和其他心理状态是如何被推断的，以及理解这些推断在其他认知过程中的作用是至关重要的。我们提出了第一次调查的自动化的信念推理。在一个偶然的错误信念的任务，成年受试者更慢地回应意想不到的问题，另一个人的信念有关的对象的位置比问题有关的对象的真实的位置。在其他条件下的结果表明，对信念问题的反应不一定比对现实问题的反应慢，因为当受试者被指示跟踪人对物体位置的信念时，他们对信念和现实问题的反应时间没有差异。结果表明，成年人不归因于自动代理的信念。
Understanding the operating characteristics of theory of mind is essential for understanding how beliefs, desires, and other mental states are inferred, and for understanding the role such inferences could play in other cognitive processes. We present the first investigation of the automaticity of belief reasoning. In an incidental false belief task, adult subjects responded more slowly to unexpected questions concerning another person's belief about an object's location than to questions concerning the object's real location. Results in other conditions showed that responses to belief questions were not necessarily slower than responses to reality questions, as subjects showed no difference in response times to belief and reality questions when they were instructed to track the person's beliefs about the object's location. The results suggest that adults do not ascribe beliefs to agents automatically.