Sorting into outsourcing: Are profits taxed at a gorilla's arm's length?
Sorting into outsourcing: Are profits taxed at a gorilla's arm's length?
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.12.002
复制
发表时间：
2013-07-01
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Langenmayr, Dominika
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bauer, Christian J.;Langenmayr, Dominika
本文根据公平交易原则，在一个异质性企业进行外包的模型中，分析了利润税。我们表明，跨国公司能够将利润转移到国外，即使他们完全遵守税法。这是因为，在均衡状态下，企业内部交易发生在投入生产优于市场的企业中。此外，市场投入价格包括企业与独立供应商之间讨价还价产生的加价。因此，按照正常交易原则按市场价值确定的转让价格系统地超过了跨国公司的边际成本，导致每售出一个单位的纳税额减少。因此，企业的最优组织为实证观察到的跨国公司较低的税收负担提供了新的理论基础。(C)2012爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
This article analyzes profit taxation according to the arm's length principle in a model where heterogeneous firms sort into foreign outsourcing. We show that multinational firms are able to shift profits abroad even if they fully comply with the tax code. This is because, in equilibrium, intra-firm transactions occur in firms that are better than the market at input production. Moreover, market input prices include a mark-up that arises from the bargaining between the firm and the independent supplier. Transfer prices set at market values following the arm's length principle thus systematically exceed multinationals' marginal costs, leading to a reduction of tax payments for each unit sold. The optimal organization of firms hence provides a new rationale for the empirically observed lower tax burden of multinational corporations. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.