Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance, Donald MacKenzie, 1990. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 500 pages. ISBN: 0-262-13258-3. $29.95
Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance, Donald MacKenzie, 1990. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 500 pages. ISBN: 0-262-13258-3. $29.95
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《发明准确性：核导弹制导的历史社会学》，Donald MacKenzie，1990 年。麻省理工学院出版社，剑桥，马萨诸塞州。
DOI：
10.2307/3106682
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发表时间：
1990
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. MacKenzie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. DeVorkin;D. MacKenzie
1993年由科学社会研究协会颁发的路德维希·弗莱克奖的赢家。在关于军备竞赛的书籍中，唐纳德·麦肯齐的书因其对核武器技术“黑匣子”的非神秘化而引人注目。麦肯齐遵循一条技术路线-战略弹道导弹制导-通过一系列武器系统来揭示一个既不可怕也不不可阻挡的世界的普通运作。他揭示了构成同样复杂的技术的复杂社会结构的参数、压力和政治。麦肯齐认为，认为导弹精度（或任何其他技术人工制品）是技术变革的自然或不可避免的结果是错误的。通过促进对准确性概念是如何构建的理解，并通过揭示导致可怕的核武库的可理解且通常是平凡的过程，他表明可以对武器建设的社会过程进行有用和知情的干预。他还指出，在什么意义上，它是可能的，相反的常识，“uninvent”technologies.审查从轰炸机到弹道导弹的过渡的技术政治，麦肯齐描述了空军和海军弹道导弹从中等精度的反城市武器到高度精确的反力量的过程。他的结论是，无论是美国还是苏联都从未接受过公众所理解的威慑思想。“发明精度”是基于对制导和导航技术专家、海军和空军军官以及国防官员罗伯特·麦克纳马拉、詹姆斯·施莱辛格、麦乔治·邦迪和约翰·福斯特的140次采访。它揭示了各种力量的汇合，包括物理的和社会的力量，这些力量促成了一个独立的导弹导航系统，它还讨论了参与惯性制导和导航早期发展的美国主要团体。唐纳德·麦肯齐发表了许多关于统计学、优生学和导弹技术的有影响力的文章。他是爱丁堡大学的社会学讲师。
Winner of the 1993 Ludwik Fleck Prize presented by the Society for Social Studies of Science (4S).Among books on the arms race, Donald MacKenzie's stands out for its welcome demystification of the "black box" of nuclear weapons technology. MacKenzie follows one line of technology - strategic ballistic missile guidance - through a succession of weapons systems to reveal the ordinary workings of a world that is neither awesome nor unstoppable. He uncovers the parameters, the pressures, and the politics that make up the complex social construction of an equally complex technology.MacKenzie argues that it is wrong to assume that missile accuracy (or any other technological artifact) is a natural or inevitable consequence of technological change. By fostering an understanding of how the idea of accuracy was constructed and by uncovering the comprehensible and often mundane processes that have given rise to a frightening nuclear arsenal, he shows that there can be useful and informed intervention in the social processes of weapons construction. He also shows in what sense it is possible, contrary to the common wisdom, to "uninvent" technologies.Examining the technological politics of the transition from bomber to ballistic missile, MacKenzie describes the processes that transformed both air force and navy ballistic missiles from moderately accurate countercity weapons to highly accurate counterforce ones. He concludes that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has ever accepted the idea of deterrence as the public understands it."Inventing Accuracy" is based on 140 interviews with guidance and navigation technologists, navy and air force military officers, and defense officials Robert McNamara, James Schlesinger, McGeorge Bundy, and John Foster. It brings to light the confluence of forces, both physical and social, that gave rise to a selfcontained system of missile navigation, and it discusses the major U.S. groups involved in the early development of inertial guidance and navigation.Donald MacKenzie has published a number of influential articles on statistics, eugenics, and missile technologies. He is Reader in Sociology at the University of Edinburgh.