Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem
Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem
复制标题
执政党政权和承诺问题
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Remington
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
O. J. Reuter;T. Remington
本文将威权政体中稳定的执政党的形成视为统治者与其他精英之间的承诺问题。在定义了一个占主导地位的政党政权，并概述了这样一个政权需要每一方的成本和收益后，作者研究了俄罗斯为建立统一俄罗斯党作为一个占主导地位的政党所做的努力，并认为克里姆林宫和地区精英通过共同投资统一俄罗斯党克服了他们的承诺问题。与以往的权力党计划不同，统一俄罗斯党代表了联邦中心与其他政治和经济精英之间的平衡安排。
This article analyzes the formation of a stable dominant party in an authoritarian regime as a commitment problem between two sides: the ruler and other elites. After defining a dominant party regime and outlining the costs and benefits that such a regime entails for each side, the authors examine the efforts made in Russia to establish United Russia as a dominant party and argue that the Kremlin and regional elites have overcome their commitment problem through mutual investment in the United Russia party. In contrast to previous party-of-power projects, United Russia represents an equilibrium arrangement between the federal center and other political and economic elite actors.