EVOLUTION OF FIGHTING BEHAVIOR - THE EFFECT OF VARIATION IN RESOURCE VALUE
EVOLUTION OF FIGHTING BEHAVIOR - THE EFFECT OF VARIATION IN RESOURCE VALUE
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DOI：
10.1016/s0022-5193(87)80130-3
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发表时间：
1987-07-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
LEIMAR, O
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
ENQUIST, M;LEIMAR, O
许多实证研究表明，当资源价值改变时，动物会调整它们的战斗行为。我们应用进化博弈论来研究资源价值的变化如何影响战斗行为的进化。虽然不能对战斗的代价和胜利的概率做出完全一般性的预测，但对于大多数与生物学相关的情况，当资源价值增加时，战斗的代价会增加，而当资源价值只增加给动物时，动物的胜利概率会增加。为了研究作战能力存在差异并进行评估时资源价值变化的影响，针对两种情况开发了序贯评估游戏。在第一种情况下，参赛者不知道对方的主观资源价值。在第二种情况下，存在所有者-入侵者不对称，所有者比入侵者更了解资源的价值。这些模型给出了战斗持续时间、成本和胜利概率的预测。的预测与经验数据进行比较，发现一个很好的定性协议。
A number of empirical studies have shown that animals adjust their fighting behaviour when resource value is changed. We apply evolutionary game theory to investigate how variation in resource value influences the evolution of fighting behaviour. Although no completely general predictions can be made concerning the cost of fighting and the probability of victory, for most situations of biological relevance the cost of fighting will increase when resource value increases and the probability of victory for an animal will increase when resource value is increased only to that animal. In order to study the effect of variation in resource value when differences in fighting ability exist and are assessed, sequential assessment games are developed for two situations. In the first situation, contestants do not know each other''s subjective resource value. In the second situation, there is an owner-intruder asymmetry where the owner is better informed about the value of the resource than the intruder. The models give predictions for fight duration, cost, and probability of victory. The predictions are compared with empirical data, and a good qualitative agreement is found.