Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage
Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage
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人类学、人权和法律知识：铁笼里的文化
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Annelise Riles
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Annelise Riles
在这篇文章中，我在人类学家和对人权制度持怀疑态度的人权律师之间的特定领域中利用民族志。我认为，人类学家在挪用和边缘化人类学分析工具时遇到的许多问题，可以从人权的法律特征来理解。特别是，人类学和人权之间的话语接触是由法律知识的普遍工具主义所激发的。我认为，试图描述人权文化的人类学家和批判性地参与人权制度的批判律师都有一个共同的问题——法律工具主义的铁笼子。我的结论是，人种学方法被重新配置为一种我称之为“绕回来”的问题——与文化描述相反——为法律工具主义的霸权提供了一个喘息的机会。
In this article, I draw on ethnography in the particular zone of engagement between anthropologists, on the one hand, and human rights lawyers who are skeptical of the human rights regime, on the other hand. I argue that many problems anthropologists encounter with the appropriation and marginalization of anthropology's analytical tools can be understood in terms of the legal character of human rights. In particular, discursive engagement between anthropology and human rights is animated by the pervasive instrumentalism of legal knowledge. I contend that both anthropologists who seek to describe the culture of human rights and critical lawyers who critically engage the human rights regime share a common problem - that of the iron cage of legal instrumentalism. I conclude that an ethnographic method reconfigured as a matter of what I term circling back - as opposed to cultural description - offers a respite from the hegemony of legal instrumentalism.