Game theoretic model for lane changing: Incorporating conflict risks
Game theoretic model for lane changing: Incorporating conflict risks
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DOI：
10.1016/j.aap.2019.02.007
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发表时间：
2019-04-01
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Dixit, Vinayak V.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Arbis, David;Dixit, Vinayak V.
这项研究采用了量子反应均衡框架来模拟换道动作。以往关于换道的博弈论研究都假设纳什均衡解具有确定性的行动收益。研究方法包括开发驾驶员合并和让行决策的预期效用模型。这些实用新型结合了表示变道操作期间驾驶员轨迹的解释变量。使用NGSIM数据集，使用高速公路入口匝道上的车道改变数据的最大似然估计模型参数。根据估计的参数，得出的结论是，加长加速车道和降低入口坡道上的速度限制有助于显着减少冲突的可能性。为了证明模型的稳健性，基于样本外数据的车道改变预测被发现是相当准确的。
The study employs a Quantal Response Equilibrium framework to model lane changing manoeuvres. Prior game theoretic studies in lane changing have pre-eminently assumed Nash equilibrium solutions with deterministic payoffs for actions. The study method involves developing expected utility models for drivers' merge and giveway decisions. These utility models incorporate explanatory variables representing driver trajectories during a lane changing manoeuvre. The model parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood on lane changing data at a freeway on-ramp using the NGSIM dataset. Based on the estimated parameters it was concluded that longer acceleration lanes and reduction of speed limits on on-ramps could help significantly reduce likelihood of conflict. To demonstrate the robustness of the model, predictions of lane changing on an out-of-sample data were found to be reasonably accurate.