Signaling to the Crowd: Private Quality Information and Rewards-Based Crowdfunding
Signaling to the Crowd: Private Quality Information and Rewards-Based Crowdfunding
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2885457
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发表时间：
2019-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Soudipta Chakraborty;R. Swinney
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Soudipta Chakraborty;R. Swinney
问题定义：我们考虑一个企业家为一个创新产品设计一个基于固定资金奖励的众筹活动。产品质量对企业家来说是已知的，但对一些支持者来说是未知的。我们研究了企业家如何通过众筹活动的设计向支持者发出质量信号，包括奖励的价格和融资目标。学术/实践相关性：众筹是一种新的和流行的方式资助创新产品。尽管有许多优点，但这种模式也存在挑战，其中最重要的挑战之一是向一群不知情的小投资者发出有关产品质量的信息。我们将探讨企业家如何实现这一目标，并克服众筹的一个关键障碍。方法：我们采用了一个博弈论模型的企业家和运动支持者之间的信号。结果：我们发现，企业家应该信号高质量的设定一个高的目标，是扭曲以上的充分信息的最优水平。虽然分离均衡总是存在的，但汇集均衡只能在非常特定的情况下发生。我们发现，高目标影响企业家的质量选择，并可能阻止独特的，高质量的项目。此外，我们讨论了企业家应该如何修改的信号策略时，一个高的目标可能会阻止支持者承诺，因为在一个失败的运动参与的成本。对管理层的影响：我们展示了企业家如何有效地设计他们的众筹活动，以表明高质量，从而为在众筹网站上列出产品的创作者提供指导。我们还发现，信息不对称和信号传递会影响创作者的产品质量决策，而这反过来又会让平台设计者感兴趣，他们希望为自己的平台招揽高质量的产品。
Problem definition: We consider an entrepreneur designing a fixed funding rewards-based crowdfunding campaign for an innovative product. Product quality is known to the entrepreneur but unknown to some backers. We study how the entrepreneur can signal quality to backers via the design of the crowdfunding campaign, including the price of the reward and the funding target. Academic/practical relevance: Crowdfunding is a new and popular way of funding innovative products. Despite numerous advantages, there are challenges to this model, one of the most significant being credibly signaling information about product quality to a pool of small, uninformed investors. We explore how an entrepreneur might accomplish this and overcome a key obstacle to crowdfunding. Methodology: We employ a game theoretic model of signaling between an entrepreneur and campaign backers. Results: We find that the entrepreneur should signal high quality by setting a high target that is distorted above the full information optimal level. While a separating equilibrium always exists, a pooling equilibrium can only occur under very specific circumstances. We show that the high target affects the quality choice of entrepreneurs and may deter unique, high-quality projects. In addition, we discuss how the entrepreneur should modify the signaling strategy when a high target potentially deters backers from pledging because of the cost of participating in a failed campaign. Managerial implications: We show how entrepreneurs can effectively design their crowdfunding campaign to signal high quality, thus providing guidance to creators listing products on crowdfunding websites. We also show information asymmetry and signaling affect product quality decisions by creators, which in turn is of interest to platform designers seeking to solicit high-quality products for their platforms.