Advertising and Coordination
Advertising and Coordination
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广告与协调
DOI：
10.2307/2297881
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Garey Ramey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Bagwell;Garey Ramey
当价格等市场信息难以沟通时，消费者和企业可能无法利用互利的规模经济，从而出现协调失败。表面上没有信息的广告支出可以用来消除协调失败，通过允许一个有效率的公司含蓄地传达它提供了一个低价格。这为Benham（1972）的经验关联提供了一个理论解释，即广告的能力与较低的价格和较大的规模。广告成为必要的最佳协调时，有效的公司的身份是不确定的。一个应用程序的损失领导者定价。
When market information such as price is difficult to communicate, consumers and firms may be unable to take advantage of mutually beneficial scale economies, so that coordination failures arise. Ostensibly uninformative advertising expenditures can be used to eliminate coordination failures, by allowing an efficient firm to communicate implicitly that it offers a low price. This provides a theoretical explanation for Benham's (1972) empirical association of the ability to advertise with lower prices and larger scale. Advertising becomes necessary for optimal coordination when the identity of the efficient firm is uncertain. An application to loss-leader pricing is developed.