Pig traders' networks on the Kenya-Uganda border highlight potential for mitigation of African swine fever virus transmission and improved ASF disease risk management
Pig traders' networks on the Kenya-Uganda border highlight potential for mitigation of African swine fever virus transmission and improved ASF disease risk management
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DOI：
10.1016/j.prevetmed.2017.03.005
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发表时间：
2017-05-01
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Bishop, Richard P.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lichoti, Jacqueline Kasiiti;Davies, Jocelyn;Bishop, Richard P.
我们将社会网络分析应用于肯尼亚-乌干达边境的生猪贸易商网络。社会网络分析是近年来发展起来的一种工具，它有助于理解价值链和改进疾病控制政策。我们采访了33名贸易商，了解他们在贸易和非洲猪瘟（ASF）方面的经验，分析了他们在购买猪和销售猪肉方面建立的网络，以及他们对调节ASF病毒（ASFV）传播的潜在贡献。大多数贸易商都知道ASF的临床症状和贸易传播ASFV的风险。大多数人表示，他们避免购买来自非洲猪瘟爆发村庄的猪或病猪，但他们的经验也表明，无意购买相对普遍。商贩们很早就知道疫情爆发，因为他们接触到了听到谣言并希望出售猪只以避免死亡风险的农民。个体贸易商在多达9个村庄购买猪，一个村庄最多有6个贸易商。虽然每次贸易通常跨越不到5公里，但各种贸易商的网络，包括将猪从来源村庄运到屠宰场/地点和零售店，以及将猪肉运到消费村庄，在100公里x50公里的研究区域间接连接起来，并揭示了肯尼亚-乌干达边境的几条贸易途径。非洲猪瘟有可能通过连续的生猪和猪肉交易在这一地区乃至更远的地区传播。贸易商使用建造不良的屠宰板/场地，并设有露天排水系统，肉类检查服务无效或不存在，价值链缺乏生物安全规定，以及向不了解自己的猪只因接触受ASF感染的猪肉而面临风险的客户销售猪肉，加剧了ASFV传播的风险。更有效的监管是必要的。然而，政府能力的局限性，以及老牌贸易商在减少疫情造成的破坏和经济损失方面的强烈自我利益，突出了政府和贸易商共同制定控制ASF方法的重要性。贸易商组织或共同利益集团的成立保证了政府的支持，这是让贸易商参与制定和实施有效方法以降低非洲猪瘟爆发风险的重要一步。(C)2017爱思唯尔B. V.保留所有权利。
We applied social network analysis to pig trader networks on the Kenya-Uganda border. Social network analysis is a recently developed tool, which is useful for understanding value chains and improving disease control policies. We interviewed a sample of 33 traders about their experiences with trade and African swine fever (ASF), analyzed the networks they generated in purchasing pigs and selling pork and their potential contribution to modulating dissemination of the ASF virus (ASFV). The majority of the traders were aware of clinical signs of ASF and the risk of trade transmitting ASFV. Most said they avoided buying pigs from ASF outbreak villages or sick pigs but their experiences also indicated that inadvertent purchase was relatively common. Traders had early knowledge of outbreaks since they were contacted by farmers who had heard rumours and wanted to sell their pigs to avoid the risk of them dying. Individual traders bought pigs in up to nine villages, and up to six traders operated in a village. Although each trade typically spanned less than 5 km, networks of the various traders, comprising movements of pigs from source villages to slaughter slabs/sites and retail outlets, and movement of pork to villages where it was consumed, linked up indirectly across the 100 km x 50 km study area and revealed several trade pathways across the Kenya-Uganda border. ASF could potentially spread across this area and beyond through sequential pig and pork transactions.Regulation of the pig and pork trade was minimal in practice. The risk of ASFV being spread by traders was compounded by their use of poorly constructed slaughter slabs/sites with open drainage, ineffective or non-existent meat inspection services, lack of provision for biosecurity in the value chain, and sales of pork to customers who were unaware of the risks to their own pigs from contact with ASF infected pork. More effective regulation is warranted. However, limitations on government capacity, together with the strong self-interest that established traders have in reducing the disruption and financial losses that outbreaks cause, highlight the importance of governments and traders co-developing an approach to ASF control. Formation of trader organizations or common interest groups warrants government support as an important step in engaging traders in developing and implementing effective approaches to reduce the risk of ASF outbreaks. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.