Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications
Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence and Implications
复制标题
失业保险中基于风险的选择：证据和启示
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Johannes Spinnewijn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Camille Landais;Arash Nekoei;Peter Nilsson;D. Seim;Johannes Spinnewijn
本文研究逆向选择是否可以合理化的普遍任务的失业保险（UI）。在瑞典的失业政策，工人可以选择补充UI覆盖以上的最低要求的一个独特的功能的基础上，我们提供了第一个直接的证据，逆向选择在UI和UI设计的影响。我们发现，购买补充保险的工人的失业风险是购买补充保险的工人的两倍多。利用风险和价格的变化，我们展示了这种相关性的25- 30%是由基于风险的选择驱动的，其余的是由道德风险驱动的。由于道德风险，尽管存在逆向选择，我们发现强制支付意愿较低的个人提供补充保险是次优的。我们展示了在哪些条件下，一个设计留给工人选择将主导一个单一的任务的UI系统。在这种设计中，使用补贴补充保险是最佳的，是对使用最低授权的补充。(JEL D82、G22、J65）
This paper studies whether adverse selection can rationalize a universal mandate for unemployment insurance (UI). Building on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt for supplemental UI coverage above a minimum mandate, we provide the first direct evidence for adverse selection in UI and derive its implications for UI design. We find that the unemployment risk is more than twice as high for workers who buy supplemental coverage. Exploiting variation in risk and prices, we show how 25–30 percent of this correlation is driven by risk-based selection, with the remainder driven by moral hazard. Due to the moral hazard and despite the adverse selection we find that mandating the supplemental coverage to individuals with low willingness-to-pay would be suboptimal. We show under which conditions a design leaving choice to workers would dominate a UI system with a single mandate. In this design, using a subsidy for supplemental coverage is optimal and complementary to the use of a minimum mandate. (JEL D82, G22, J65)