Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961-2004
Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961-2004
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DOI：
10.1177/0738894208097664
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发表时间：
2009-02-01
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
De Soysa, Indra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fjelde, Hanne;De Soysa, Indra
最近的研究表明，国家能力是国内和平的关键决定因素。学者们经常将财富与和平之间的联系解释为国家能力效应，但他们没有明确区分行政权力范围和胁迫能力的影响与那些可能涉及与提供政治物品和机构质量有关的良好治理的影响。我们通过提出三种不同的途径来重新审视国家能力和公民和平之间的关系，通过这些途径，国家可以避免对其权威的暴力挑战：胁迫、拉拢和合作。我们对这三种不同的执政能力概念进行了分析和实证评估，我们发现，与国家的强制能力相比，政府在政治产品和值得信赖的机构上的高水平支出是公民和平的更重要的预测因素。结果表明，公民和平是由社会和国家力量共同产生的，社会的准自愿合作增加了国家维持和平的能力。对于旨在建设国家能力的政策来说，这是个好消息，因为除了简单地等待社会变得富裕之外，似乎还有代理的空间。
Recent research identifies state capacity as a crucial determinant of civil peace. Scholars often interpret the association between wealth and peace as state capacity effects, but they have not clearly distinguished the impact of administrative reach and capacity for coercion from those effects that may capture good governance related to the provision of political goods and quality of institutions. We revisit the relationship between state capacity and civil peace by suggesting three different pathways through which the state avoids violent challenges to its authority: coercion, co-optation, and cooperation. We evaluate these three different notions of governing capacity both analytically and empirically, and we find that high levels of government spending on political goods and trustworthy institutions are more significant predictors of civil peace than are states' coercive capacities. The results suggest that civil peace is co-produced by social and state forces, where quasi-voluntary cooperation from society increases state capacity for maintaining peace. This is good news for policies aimed at building state capacity, since there seems to be room for agency beyond simply waiting for societies to become wealthy.