In defense of posthuman dignity
In defense of posthuman dignity
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00437.x
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发表时间：
2005-06-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Bostrom, N
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bostrom, N
关于人类增强技术的伦理立场可以（粗略地）概括为从超人类主义到生物保守主义。超人类主义者认为，人类增强技术应该广泛使用，个人应该有广泛的自由裁量权来决定将哪些技术应用于自己，父母通常应该有权为他们的孩子选择增强技术。生物保守派（其成员包括莱昂·卡斯、弗朗西斯·福山、乔治·安纳斯、韦斯利·史密斯、杰里米·里夫金和比尔·麦基本等不同的作家）普遍反对使用技术来改变人性。生物保守主义的一个中心思想是人类增强技术将损害我们人类的尊严。为了防止滑向最终堕落的“后人类”状态，生物保守派经常主张广泛禁止原本有前途的人类增强技术。本文区分了对后人类的两种常见恐惧，并论证了尊严概念的重要性，该概念具有足够的包容性，足以适用于许多可能的后人类。认识到后人类尊严的可能性，削弱了对人类增强的重要反对意见，并从我们的道德视野中消除了扭曲性的双重标准。
Positions on the ethics of human enhancement technologies can be (crudely) characterized as ranging from transhumanism to bioconservatism. Transhumanists believe that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves, and that parents should normally have the right to choose enhancements for their children-to-be. Bioconservatives (whose ranks include such diverse writers as Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, George Annas, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Rifkin, and Bill McKibben) are generally opposed to the use of technology to modify human nature. A central idea in bioconservativism is that human enhancement technologies will undermine our human dignity. To forestall a slide down the slippery slope towards an ultimately debased 'posthuman' state, bioconservatives often argue for broad bans on otherwise promising human enhancements.This paper distinguishes two common fears about the posthuman and argues for the importance of a concept of dignity that is inclusive enough to also apply to many possible posthuman beings. Recognizing the possibility of posthuman dignity undercuts an important objection against human enhancement and removes a distortive double standard from our field of moral vision.