Prohibition of Riba and Gharar: A signaling and screening explanation?
Prohibition of Riba and Gharar: A signaling and screening explanation?
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禁止 Riba 和 Gharar：信号和筛选解释？
DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.02.016
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Jeong‐Yoo Kim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Berg;Jeong‐Yoo Kim
伊斯兰银行（IB）的出现，其伊斯兰教法董事会限制了可允许的产品集合，并强制禁止了ribanandghararra，这引发了一个基本问题：当IB客户从可能成本更高的受限现金流菜单中进行选择时，他们如何受益？限制选择集的规范，或强加其他苛刻的要求，似乎会增加IB客户的成本，从而成为宗教认同的障碍。与这种直觉相反，我们的模型表明，与被认为符合伊斯兰教法的融资选择集限制相关的溢价成本提供了一种信号和筛选技术，使高度虔诚的IB客户受益。通过揭示宗教虔诚程度的隐私信息，这种信号技术同时提供了一种筛选服务，使高度虔诚的人能够区分自己，并集中与同样虔诚的人进行社会和商业互动。Iannaccone（1992）论证了严苛规范作为减少俱乐部商品供应搭便车机制的基本原理。相反，我们的模型表明，虔诚可以通过选择成为IB客户的行为来表现，并承担其有限选择集的成本和其他相同现金流的溢价定价。信号和筛选为禁止暴力提供了新的合理性，使其成为一种稳定的制度。在虔诚不确定或他人难以观察的环境中，虔诚的信号尤其有价值。该模型预测，在高度虔诚的穆斯林比例较小的地方，IB的伊斯兰教法合规标准将趋于更严格，IB的溢价也会更高。
The emergence of Islamic Banks (IBs) with Sharia boards that restrict the set of permissible products and enforce prohibition ofribaandghararraises basic questions about how IB clients benefit when choosing from a restricted menu of possibly higher-cost cash flows. Norms that restrict choice sets, or impose otherwise harsh requirements, would seem to act as a barrier to religious identification by raising costs for IB clients. Contrary to this intuition, our model demonstrates that premium costs associated with restrictions on the set of financing options considered to be Sharia-compliant provide a signaling and screening technology that benefits IB clients who are highly pious. By revealing what would otherwise remain private information about the intensity of religious piety, this signaling technology simultaneously provides a screening service that enables high-piety types to separate themselves and concentrate both social and commercial interactions with others who are similarly pious. Iannaccone (1992) demonstrates a rationale for harsh norms as a mechanism for reducing free-riding in the supply of club goods. In contrast, our model shows that piety can be signaled by the act of choosing to become an IB client and bearing the costs of its restricted choice set and premium pricing for otherwise identical cash flows. Signaling and screening provide a new rationalization for prohibition ofribaandghararas a stable institution. Signaling piety is especially valuable in environments where piety is uncertain and otherwise difficult for others to observe. The model predicts that IBs’ Sharia-compliance criteria will tend to be stricter and IB premiums larger in places where the proportion of highly pious Muslims is small.
阅读，A.F.：“进化生物学可以为理解毒力做出什么贡献？第 205-215 页，S.Stearns 编辑的《健康与疾病的进化》。”
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