Obligation through practice
Obligation through practice
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通过实践履行义务
作者：
Christian Reus
尽管许多人呼吁在国际法和国际关系领域之间建立桥梁，但真正的综合研究却很少。律师们在他们的作品中加入了一些真实的政治，在那里实现了效用最大化;国际关系学者们则获得了法律的解释的权威，并收获了对法律的推理的见解。但这些很少是真正对话的练习，目的是产生新的理论观点，这些观点不仅仅是其部分的总和，这有望促进两个领域的理解。在这方面，《国际法中的合法性和合法性》令人耳目一新。Brunnee和Toope挖掘了国际法律的和国际关系理论的两条互补链，以产生一种“相互干扰”的国际法理论。他们挖掘得足够深，能够抓住每一条线索的复杂性，并巧妙地将朗·富勒的法律方法（移植到国际竞技场）和建构主义国际关系结合起来。由此产生的干预理论有许多值得称道之处：首先，它与法律的命令理论彻底决裂，后者将法律降格为以制裁为后盾的主权当局的法令。Brunnee和Toope将焦点从法律的起源-其权威来源-转移到其质量特征。他们认为，“区分法律的规范与其他类型的社会规范的不是形式或谱系，而是对特定合法性标准的坚持”（Brunnée and Toope，2011，307）。无论这种方法有什么局限性，它都为我们提供了另一种明智的思考方式，即法律如何在国际一级发挥作用，因为从这个角度来看，法律的规范可以出现在缺乏中央权威的分散的“实践社区”中。第二，它将国际法视为基于社会理解的实践。它常常被视为一种具体化的制度，一套由国家“立法”的编纂规范，或多或少地接受权威性的解释。对于Brunnée和Toope来说，国际法是不可分割地嵌入在更广泛的社会秩序中，其含义是：
Despite the many calls for bridge building between the fields of International Law and International Relations, genuinely integrative studies are few and far between. Lawyers leaven their writings with a dash of real politic here and utility maximizing there; International Relations scholars enlist the authority of legal interpretation and harvest insights into legal reasoning. But these are seldom exercises in genuine dialog, aimed at producing new theoretical perspectives, views that are more than the sum of their parts, which promise to advance understanding in both fields. Legitimacy and Legality in International Law is refreshing in this regard. Brunnee and Toope mine two complimentary strands of international legal and international relations theory to generate an ‘interactional’ theory of international law. They dig deep enough to grasp the complexities of each strand, and produce an artfully integrated amalgam of Lon Fuller’s approach to law (transplanted into the international arena) and constructivist international relations. The resulting interactional theory has much to commend it. First, it makes a decisive break with command theories of law, which reduce law to the edicts of sovereign authorities backed by sanctions. Brunnée and Toope shift the focus away from the origins of law – its authoritative sources – to its qualitative characteristics. ‘[W]hat distinguishes legal norms from other types of social norms’, they argue, ‘is not form or pedigree, but adherence to specific criteria of legality’ (Brunnée and Toope 2011, 307). Whatever the limitations of this approach, it gives us another way of thinking sensibly about how law might function at the international level, as legal norms, from this perspective, can emerge in decentralized ‘communities of practice’ lacking central authority. Second, it treats international law as a practice grounded in social understandings. All too often it is treated as a reified institution, a set of codified norms, ‘legislated’ by states, open to more or less authoritative interpretation. For Brunnée and Toope, international law is inextricably embedded within the wider social order, its meanings are Symposium on Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope