Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs
Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs
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DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0026
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发表时间：
1996-03-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Moser, D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kagel, JH;Kim, C;Moser, D
玩家可以通过不同的汇率和关于这些汇率的不同信息获得筹码。出价一般反映了一种自私的公平定义。有充分的证据表明，相对收入份额进入球员的效用函数，导致可预测的变化，在拒绝率和报价。然而，当先行者故意提供不平等的资金分配时，与明显无意的可比报价相比，报价更有可能被拒绝。当两个参与者都被充分告知并且先行者有更高的交换率时，相互冲突的公平规范就会产生，导致异常高的拒绝率。(C)出版社：Academic Press，Inc.
Players bar gained over chips with different exchange rates and with different information regarding these exchange rates. Offers generally reflected a self-serving definition of fairness. There is ample evidence that relative income shares entered players utility functions, resulting in predictable variations in both rejection rates and offers. However, offers were significantly more likely to be rejected when first-movers intentionally offered unequal money splits compared to when comparable offers were clearly unintentional. When both players were fully informed and first-movers had higher exchange rates, conflicting fairness norms developed, resulting in unusually high rejection rates. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.