Legislative organization with informational committees
Legislative organization with informational committees
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DOI：
10.2307/2669260
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发表时间：
2000-07-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Baron, DP
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Baron, DP
在面对不确定的政策结果的立法组织已被调查的角度信号模型，其中一个知情的委员会报告的法案，然后修改，颁布，或拒绝该法案的立法机构。然而，作为政治主体，立法机构可以发挥领导作用，而不是对其代理人的工作作出反应。本文提出了一种新的立法组织理论--信息委员会立法组织理论，即立法机关作为主体，在委员会开始立法工作之前，明确地与委员会建立联系。该理论提供了许多完全不同的预测。例如，在信号理论中，封闭规则比开放规则能为温和委员会的专业化提供更强的激励，而在该理论中，开放规则提供更强的激励。此外，立法机构更愿意与委员会一起制定安排，而不是简单地对委员会的努力作出反应。
Legislative organization in the face of uncertain policy outcomes has been investigated from the perspective of signaling models in which an informed committee reports a bill and the legislature then amends, enacts, or rejects the bill. As the political principal, however, the legislature could take the lead rather than react to the work of its agent. This article presents a new theory of legislative organization with informational committees in which the legislature as the principal explicitly structures its arrangement with a committee before the committee begins its legislative work. The theory provides a number of quite different predictions. For example, in the signaling theory a closed rule can create stronger incentives for specialization by a moderate committee than an open rule, whereas in this theory an open rule provides stronger incentives. Moreover, the legislature prefers to structure the arrangement with the committee rather than simply react to its efforts.