On the Frequency of Interior Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy
On the Frequency of Interior Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy
复制标题
公共物品经济中内部古诺-纳什均衡的频率
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00270.x
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Peters
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Buchholz;R. Cornes;W. Peters
In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good. For the case when all individuals have identical preferences in this paper a simple formula is derived that describes the proportion of all income distributions for which an interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium will result in which every agent makes a strictly positive contribution to the public good. This formula is then applied to a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function showing that the likelihood of interior Cournot-Nash equilibria falls dramatically when the number of individuals is increased. The implications this result might have for the significance of Shibata-Warr neutrality are finally discussed.
