External trade diversion, exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements
External trade diversion, exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements
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对外贸易转移、排除激励和优惠贸易协定的性质
DOI：
10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.01.002
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
H. M. Yildiz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paul Missios;Kamal Saggi;H. M. Yildiz
在三个国家之间的内生贸易协定的博弈中，我们表明，虽然追求关税同盟（CU）阻止了全球自由贸易成为一个联盟的纳什均衡，但追求自由贸易协定（FTA）不会。这一结果反映了自由贸易协定的相对灵活性：每个自由贸易协定成员国可以独立地对非成员国实行进一步的贸易自由化，而CU成员国由于共同的对外关税，必须作为一个集团这样做。这两类贸易协定都将成员国的出口从非成员国分流，诱使非成员国自愿降低进口关税。
In a game of endogenous trade agreements between three countries, we show that while the pursuit of customs unions (CUs) prevents global free trade from emerging as a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, the pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) does not. This result reflects the relativelyflexiblenature of FTAs: whereas each FTA member can independently undertake further trade liberalization with respect to the non-member, CU members must do so as a group due to their common external tariff. By diverting members' exports away from the non-member, both types of trade agreements induce the non-member to voluntarily lower its import tariffs.