Pay‐Back‐Revenue‐Sharing Contract in Coordinating Supply Chains with Random Yield
Pay‐Back‐Revenue‐Sharing Contract in Coordinating Supply Chains with Random Yield
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DOI：
10.1111/poms.12240
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发表时间：
2014-12
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
S. Tang;Panos Kouvelis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Tang;Panos Kouvelis
我们考虑在供应商的生产过程中，供应商的随机产量损失的协调问题。对于一个单一供应商和零售商的简单供应链，面对确定的需求，支付合同，零售商支付折扣价格的供应商的超额单位可以提供正确的激励供应商增加他的生产规模和实现协调。在此基础上，我们考虑其他两个供应链的协调问题：一个竞争的零售商，其他随机需求。当零售商在需求和供应方面竞争时，他们往往会过度订购。我们发现，一个回报和收入共享机制的组合可以协调供应链，与回报机制纠正供应商的生产不足的问题和收入共享机制纠正零售商的超额订购问题。当需求是随机的，我们考虑一个修改后的回报收入共享合同下，零售商同意不仅购买供应商的超额产量（超过零售商的订单），但也与供应商分享一部分的收入从销售的超额产量。我们表明，这种合同，通过给供应商额外的激励形式的收入份额，可以实现协调。
We consider coordination issues in supply chains where supplier's production process is subject to random yield losses. For a simple supply chain with a single supplier and retailer facing deterministic demand, a pay back contract which has the retailer paying a discount price for the supplier's excess units can provide the right incentive for the supplier to increase his production size and achieve coordination. Building upon this result, we consider coordination issues for two other supply chains: one with competing retailers, the other with stochastic demand. When retailers compete for both demand and supply, they tend to over‐order. We show that a combination of a pay back and revenue sharing mechanism can coordinate the supply chain, with the pay back mechanism correcting the supplier's under‐producing problem and the revenue sharing mechanism correcting the retailers' over‐ordering problem. When demand is stochastic, we consider a modified pay‐back‐revenue‐sharing contract under which the retailer agrees to not only purchase the supplier's excess output (beyond the retailer's order), but also share with the supplier a portion of the revenue made from the sales of the excess output. We show that this contract, by giving the supplier additional incentives in the form of revenue share, can achieve coordination.