The impact of Japan’s stewardship code on shareholder voting
The impact of Japan’s stewardship code on shareholder voting
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日本管理守则对股东投票的影响
DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2019.12.014
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Tsukioka Yasutomo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nir Kshetri;Lailani Alcantara;Tsukioka Yasutomo
本研究旨在探讨日本《管理守则》对机构投资者股东投票行为的影响。管理守则不是强制性的，具有法律约束力的法规，但它鼓励机构投资者行使其投票权，并监督其被投资公司，以提高其被投资公司的价值。我发现，日本的管理守则导致信托银行和保险公司，接受守则，并不借钱给他们的投资公司，成为更有可能投票反对任命代表董事和CEO的公司利润率较低。此外，在守则之后，养老基金和外国股东更有可能投票反对在盈利能力较低的公司任命代表董事和首席执行官。这些结果表明，日本的管理守则促进了机构投资者的投票活动。
This study investigates the impact of Japan’s Stewardship Code on the shareholder voting behavior of institutional investors. The stewardship code is not mandatory with legally binding regulations, but it encourages institutional investors to exercise their voting rights and monitor their investee firms to improve their investee firm value. I find that Japan’s Stewardship Code leads trust banks and insurance companies that accept the code and do not lend money to their investee firms to become more likely to vote against the appointment of representative directors and CEOs in firms with lower profitability. Furthermore, after the code, pension funds and foreign shareholders become more likely to vote against the appointment of representative directors and CEO appointments in firms with lower profitability. These results suggest that Japan’s Stewardship Code promotes voting activities of institutional investors.