Knowing How
Knowing How
复制标题
知道如何
作者:
Yuri Cath
‘Knowledge-how’is the knowledge you have when you know how to do something. For example, when you know how to dance the tango, or solve a certain equation, or ride a bike etc. Influenced by Ryle (1949), the traditional view of knowledge-how had two components:(i) a negative claim (anti-intellectualism) that knowledge-how is not any kind of knowledgethat (or any other propositional attitude state); and (ii) a positive claim (abilitism or dispositionalism) that knowledge-how is some kind of ability or complex dispositional state. This traditional Rylean view was, for a long time, a largely unquestioned feature of philosophical orthodoxy. 1 There were occasional challenges to the traditional view but these challenges generated little sustained debate, and did not seriously threaten the orthodox status of Ryleanism.This comfortable state of affairs was turned on its head by Stanley and Williamson’s (2001) paper ‘Knowing How’, which:(i) defended intellectualism—the view that knowing-how is a kind of knowing-that—against Ryle’s famous regress argument and other objections,(ii) argued against the Rylean’s positive claim that knowing-how is a kind of ability and (iii) provided a linguistic argument for an intellectualist view according to which knowing how to È is a matter of knowing a proposition that answers the embedded ‘how to È’question. Stanley and Williamson’s paper helped to set off an explosion of new work on knowledge-how. The purpose of this paper is to survey some of the main developments in this literature over the last 10 years (when necessary, some earlier works that are still important to these debates will also be discussed).