Political promotion incentives and within-firm pay gap: Evidence from China
Political promotion incentives and within-firm pay gap: Evidence from China
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政治晋升激励和企业内部薪酬差距：来自中国的证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2020.106715
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发表时间：
2020-03-01
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Lu, Ruichang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kong, Gaowen;Kong, Tony Dongmin;Lu, Ruichang
在本文中，我们考察了政治家的晋升激励如何影响当地公司高管和员工之间的薪酬差距。我们发现，地方政府官员的晋升激励显著地缩小了企业内部的薪酬差距。这种影响对大企业、政府干预较多地区的企业、国有企业、有政治人脉的民营企业以及业务地理集中度较高的企业更为明显。我们的研究结果支持将地震造成的顶级政治关系损失和经济损失作为晋升激励的工具变量。此外，薪酬差距的缩小主要是由于员工薪酬的增加，而不是高管薪酬的下降。总体而言，这项研究从当地政客对职业生涯的担忧的角度，揭示了公司内部薪酬差距的决定因素。(C)2020 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。
In this paper, we investigate how the promotion incentive of politicians affects the pay gap between executives and employees in local firms. We find that the promotion incentive of local politicians significantly reduces the within-firm pay gap. This effect is more pronounced for large firms, firms in regions subject to more government intervention, state-owned-enterprises, private firms with political connections, and firms with more geographically concentrated operations. Our findings are robust to the use of the loss of top-rank political connections and economics loss due to earthquakes as instrumental variables for the promotion incentive. Furthermore, a reduction in pay gap is mainly driven by an increase in employee pay, instead of a decrease in executive pay. Overall, this study sheds light on the determinants of within-firm pay gaps from the perspective of the career concerns of local politicians. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.