Whistle-blowing regulation in different corporate governance systems: an analysis of the regulation approaches from the view of path dependence theory

Whistle-blowing regulation in different corporate governance systems: an analysis of the regulation approaches from the view of path dependence theory
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不同公司治理制度下的举报监管:路径依赖理论视角下的监管路径分析

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发表时间:
2016
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通讯作者:
E. Pittroff
E. Pittroff
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
E. Pittroff

文献摘要

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本文的研究问题是,如果和为什么国家需要不同的法律的方法来举报监管。本文具体探讨了其他国家的监管方法是否适合于监管德国公司治理体系中的举报行为。首先,它是澄清哪些因素影响的选择所需的行动,即“内部举报”,它表明,基本的公司治理制度有一个潜在的影响这些因素。其次,本文指出,制度的一致性是导致某些法律的举报监管方法在特殊的公司治理制度中缺乏成功的原因,而在其他制度中,它们可以非常成功。最后,本文提出了不损害基本公司治理体系一致性的举报监管要求。研究结果支持路径依赖理论,即一国的法律的方法不能转移到其他国家。此外,一个国家的基本公司治理制度影响着雇员的权力和忠诚,这一事实扩大了举报文献的范围。它为举报研究以及公司治理监管的潜在趋同提出了新的途径。研究结果为有兴趣制定本国举报监管法律的提案的政策制定者提供了见解。此外,它提供了一个新的视角,使跨国公司的管理人员设计不同的公司治理体系内的举报制度。
The research question of this paper is, if and why countries need different legal approaches to whistle-blowing regulation. The paper specifically explores whether regulation approaches from other countries are suitable to regulate whistle-blowing in the German corporate governance system. First, it is clarified which factors influence the choice of the desired action—that is, “internal whistle-blowing”—and it is demonstrated that the underlying corporate governance system has a potential influence on these factors. Next, it is shown that the consistency of systems is responsible for the lack of success of some legal approaches of the whistle-blowing regulation in special corporate governance systems, whereas in other systems they can be very successful. Finally, the paper presents the requirements for whistle-blowing regulation that does not damage the consistency of the underlying corporate governance system. The findings support path dependence theory, which claims that legal approaches of one country cannot be transferred to other countries. Moreover, whistle-blowing literature is expanded by the fact that the underlying corporate governance system of a country influences the power and loyalty of the employee. It suggests new avenues for whistle-blowing research as well as for the potential convergence of corporate governance regulation. The findings offer insights for policy makers interested in the development of legal proposals for whistle-blowing regulation in their countries. Moreover, it provides a new perspective to enable managers of multinational firms to design whistle-blowing systems within different corporate governance systems.