Do partial land rights increase productivity and investment? Evidence from the redistributive land reform in post-World War II Japan
Do partial land rights increase productivity and investment? Evidence from the redistributive land reform in post-World War II Japan
复制标题
部分土地使用权是否会提高生产力和投资？
DOI：
10.1111/deve.12309
复制
发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
and Kuniaki SAITO
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
TAKAYAMA;Taisuke;Hirotaka MATSUDA;Tomoaki NAKATANI;and Kuniaki SAITO
在发展经济学文献中，关于土地改革的因果效应及其关键渠道的研究尚无定论。其中一个挑战是将土地权运作的渠道分开。本研究考察了二战后日本土地再分配改革对农业生产力和投资的影响。这一改革对土地持有设置了上限，将超过上限的农田从地主重新分配给租户，并严重限制了重新分配的农田的可转让性。因此，我们可以将权属安全效应（而不是可交易性和质押性效应）作为一种可能的渠道。利用改革前后（即1947年和1948年）的水稻农场面板数据，我们利用了不同租户在改革实施中的差异。土地改革对全要素生产率和后续季节投资影响不大。我们的研究结果表明，土地权利的安全维度本身并不能提高短期农业生产力。
There are inconclusive findings on the causal effect of land reform and its crucial channels in the development economics literature. One challenge is to separate the channels, through which land rights operate. This study examines the impact of redistributive land reform in post–World War II Japan on agricultural productivity and investments. This reform imposed a ceiling on landholdings, redistributed above‐ceiling farmland from landlords to tenants, and severely restricted the transferability of redistributed farmland. Thus, we can focus on the tenure security effect (not the tradability and pledgeability effects) as one probable channel. Using rice‐farm panel data before and after the reform (i.e., 1947 and 1948), we exploit the variation in the reform implementation across tenants. The land reform had little effect on total factor productivity and investment in the subsequent season. Our results suggest that the security dimension of land rights alone does not increase short‐run agricultural productivity.