Direct Equity Financing: A Resolution of a Paradox
Direct Equity Financing: A Resolution of a Paradox
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直接股权融资：悖论的解决
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb02215.x
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发表时间：
1982
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
J. Pinkerton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Hansen;J. Pinkerton
在筹集新的股本时，基金经理历来拒绝直接发行，转而青睐看似更昂贵的承销公开发行。本文对这一股权融资悖论提出了解决方案，通过实证证明，参与直接要约的公司享有比较成本优势，这足以解释两种股权融资方式的绝对报告成本差异。
When raising new equity capital managers have historically rejected the direct offer method favoring instead the seemingly more expensive underwritten public issue. This paper provides a resolution for this equity financing paradox by demonstrating empirically that firms which engage in direct offers enjoy a comparative cost advantage that is more than sufficient to account for the absolute reported cost differences between the two methods of equity financing.