The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption
The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2376662
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发表时间：
2014-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Maxime C. Cohen;R. Lobel;G. Perakis
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文献类型：
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作者：
Maxime C. Cohen;R. Lobel;G. Perakis
本文在考虑制造业反应的同时，研究了政府对绿色技术采用的补贴。直接提供给消费者的政府补贴会影响供应商的生产和定价决策。我们的分析扩展了当前对定价报童模型的理解，纳入了政府的外部影响，政府现在是该系统中的一个新增参与者。我们量化了在设计政策时需求不确定性如何影响各个参与者（政府、行业和消费者）。我们进一步表明，对于凸需求函数，需求不确定性的增加会导致更高的产量和更低的价格，从而使供应商的利润降低。考虑到这一点，人们可能会预期消费者剩余会随着不确定性的增加而增加。事实上，我们表明情况并非总是如此，不确定性对消费者剩余的影响取决于较低价格与高估值客户服务不足的可能性之间的权衡。我们还表明，当政府等政策制定者在设计消费者补贴时忽略需求不确定性，他们可能会大大偏离预期的采用目标水平。从协调的角度来看，我们证明了分散决策对于联合管理供应商和政府的中央计划者来说也是最优的。因此，补贴提供了一种协调机制。本文已被约西·阿维夫（运营管理）录用。
This paper studies government subsidies for green technology adoption while considering the manufacturing industry’s response. Government subsidies offered directly to consumers impact the supplier’s production and pricing decisions. Our analysis expands the current understanding of the price-setting newsvendor model, incorporating the external influence from the government, who is now an additional player in the system. We quantify how demand uncertainty impacts the various players (government, industry, and consumers) when designing policies. We further show that, for convex demand functions, an increase in demand uncertainty leads to higher production quantities and lower prices, resulting in lower profits for the supplier. With this in mind, one could expect consumer surplus to increase with uncertainty. In fact, we show that this is not always the case and that the uncertainty impact on consumer surplus depends on the trade-off between lower prices and the possibility of underserving customers with high valuations. We also show that when policy makers such as governments ignore demand uncertainty when designing consumer subsidies, they can significantly miss the desired adoption target level. From a coordination perspective, we demonstrate that the decentralized decisions are also optimal for a central planner managing jointly the supplier and the government. As a result, subsidies provide a coordination mechanism. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management .