Going Alone Together: Joint Outside Options in Bilateral Negotiations
Going Alone Together: Joint Outside Options in Bilateral Negotiations
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00250.x
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发表时间：
2004-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Paola Manzini;M. Mariotti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Paola Manzini;M. Mariotti
在某些合同情况下，只有在双方同意的情况下，当事各方才可以“退出”谈判，抓住外部机会。例子包括雇主和雇员的谈判、离婚和继承程序以及仲裁。为了分析这种情况，我们提出了“联合外部期权”的一般概念，并研究了它在标准讨价还价博弈中的作用。本文对国际贸易和企业理论中的一些例子进行了深入的研究。版权所有2004皇家经济学会。
Several contractual situations are such that the parties may 'step out' of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include employer - employee negotiations, divorce and inheritance procedures, and arbitration. To analyse such cases we develop the general concept of a 'joint outside option' and study its effect in the standard bargaining game. Examples from the international trade and theory of the firm are considered in some depth. Copyright 2004 Royal Economic Society.