Editorial: American recession
Editorial: American recession
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社论:美国经济衰退
DOI:
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发表时间:
2002
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Jamie Peck
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作者:
Jamie Peck
Recessions are, in many ways, ordinary economic events. And certainly they seem to have become so much more ordinary in the post-1973 ‘leaden age’ of slow economic growth and persistent labourmarket instability, a period that has been punctuated by no less than five recessions in the United States. Nothing unusual in the present economic slowdown, then? Perhaps, except this time we had been led to believe that things would be different. In the course of the longest economic expansion on record, during which the neoliberal foe of inflation seemed finally to have been laid to rest, America famously had forged a new mode of growth – the ‘new economy’. Driven by raw computing power and steered by an all-knowing Federal Reserve, the new growth was just what the markets had ordered: it delivered stable prices, soaring profits and flat wages. In these new-economy times, a surging stock market had combined with strong economic growth, a long-awaited improvement in the productivity figures and an unprecedented expansion in jobs to create a sense of politicaleconomic invincibility in the United States. Typical of the mood at the peak of the boom was the declaration by Thomas Petzinger Jr in the Wall Street Journal that, ‘the business cycle – a creation of the Industrial Age – may well become an anachronism’ (1999, R31). Meanwhile, even sober analysts like Alan Blinder and Janet Yellen (2001, 81) were moved to conclude that the ‘fabulous decade’ of the 1990s represented ‘one of the great shining moments of American economic history’. Talking up the economic success of the 1990s was not just a pastime of those with material interests in continually rising stock prices. It represented a shared vision of an influential network of economic policy-makers, management gurus, financial journalists, business analysts and consultants, many of whom were proclaiming loudly that the economic ‘rules’ had changed permanently in this new age of smart technology, turbo capitalism and knowledge-driven growth. Crucially, this American form of growth had been delivered in the context of a resolutely neoliberal policy framework, the apparent superiority of which could be demonstrated even by casual comparisons with the (continental) European or Japanese economies.