General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models
复制标题
持久竞争对手之间的普遍威慑：测试三种竞争模型
DOI：
10.2307/2938956
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
B. Russett
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paul K. Huth;B. Russett
与直接威慑不同，一般威慑很少以系统的比较方式进行分析。我们概述了这样做的研究设计，通过研究的情况下，在一组持久的竞争，挑战者可能会发起军事化的争端。我们指出了必要的概念和操作步骤，使和经验比较的预测来自三个经常相互竞争的理论框架：理性威慑，理性的冲突发起的一般模型，以及行为的认知心理模型，强调风险导向和误解。自1945年以来持久竞争的汇总时间序列的概率分析的结果提供了支持的假设，从每个不同的理论模型。
General deterrence, unlike immediate deterrence, has rarely been analyzed in a systematic comparative manner. We outline a research design for doing so, by studying the circumstances under which, in a set of enduring rivalries, challengers are likely to initiate militarized disputes. We indicate the conceptual and operational steps necessary to make and empirically compare predictions stemming from three often-competing theoretical frameworks: rational deterrence, a general model of rational conflict initiation, and a cognitive psychological model of behavior emphasizing risk orientation and misperception. The results of probit analysis on a pooled time series of enduring rivalries since 1945 provide support for hypotheses from each of the different theoretical models.