Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California
Implementing Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits in California
复制标题
在加利福尼亚州实施风险限制的选举后审计
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1411219
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Tricia Webber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. L. Hall;P. Stark;Luke W. Miratrix;Melvin Briones;Elaine Ginnold;F. Oakley;M. Peaden;Gail Pellerin;Tom Stanionis;Tricia Webber
如果选举结果不是全面计票所显示的结果，限制风险的选举后审计会限制证明选举结果的机会。在以前工作的基础上[18，17，20，21，11]，我们报告了2008年在三个加州县的四次选举中的试点风险限制审计：一次是2008年2月马林县的初选，三次是2008年11月马林县、圣克鲁斯县和约洛县的大选。我们解释是什么使审计风险限制和现有的和拟议的法律是如何不足的。我们讨论了我们的四个试点审计之间的差异。我们确定的挑战，切实有效的风险限制审计，并得出结论，目前的方法太复杂，不能大规模地常规使用。一个重要的后勤瓶颈是难以以便于审计计算的格式从商业选举管理系统输出数据。最后，我们提出了一个准系统的风险限制审计，是比这些试点审计效率较低，但避免了许多实际问题。
Risk-limiting postelection audits limit the chance of certifying an electoral outcome if the outcome is not what a full hand count would show. Building on previous work [18, 17, 20, 21, 11], we report pilot risk-limiting audits in four elections during 2008 in three California counties: one during the February 2008 Primary Election in Marin County and three during the November 2008 General Elections in Marin, Santa Cruz and Yolo Counties. We explain what makes an audit risk-limiting and how existing and proposed laws fall short. We discuss the differences among our four pilot audits. We identify challenges to practical, efficient risk-limiting audits and conclude that current approaches are too complex to be used routinely on a large scale. One important logistical bottleneck is the difficulty of exporting data from commercial election management systems in a format amenable to audit calculations. Finally, we propose a barebones risk-limiting audit that is less efficient than these pilot audits, but avoids many practical problems.