Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral
Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral
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优先顺序冲突：契约和抵押品理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Giorgia Piacentino
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Donaldson;Denis Gromb;Giorgia Piacentino
有抵押品担保的债务在违约情况下具有绝对优先权--它优先于无担保债务，即使无担保债务受到禁止新的有担保债务的负面质押契约的保护。我们开发了一个模型，说明这种优先权规则如何导致债权人之间的冲突，但仍然可以是最优的：借款人选择在违反契约的情况下使用抵押品，允许稀释现有债务，从而防止投资不足，而债权人在违反契约后加速债务的选择，可以阻止稀释，从而防止过度投资。最佳投资政策可以通过混合不同类型的债务来实施，包括有担保和无担保的债务，有紧有松的契约。该模型与一些关于债务结构、契约及其违反行为的程式化事实是一致的。
Debt secured by collateral has absolute priority in the event of default—it is paid ahead of unsecured debt, even if unsecured debt is protected by negative pledge covenants prohibiting new secured debt. We develop a model of how this priority rule leads to conflicts among creditors, but can be optimal nonetheless: borrowers’ option to use collateral in violation of covenants allows for the dilution of existing debt, and hence prevents under-investment, whereas creditors’ option to accelerate debt following a covenant violation deters dilution, and hence prevents over-investment. The optimal investment policy is implementable via a mix of different types of debt, including secured and unsecured debt with tight and loose covenants. The model is consistent with a number of stylized facts about debt structure, covenants, and their violations.