Moral hazard in physician prescription behavior
Moral hazard in physician prescription behavior
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DOI：
10.1016/s0167-6296(00)00033-3
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发表时间：
2000-09-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Lundin, D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lundin, D
I examine whether the choice made by physicians concerning what drug version trade-name or generic - to prescribe is subject to moral hazard. I use a data set containing information on exactly what drug and what version was prescribed at a particular patient visit to the physician.The results indicate that physicians' habits and the tastes acquired by patients are important. However, costs also matter. Patients having to pay large sums out-of-pocket are less likely to have trade-name versions prescribed than patients getting most of their costs reimbursed, This indicates moral hazard, (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: I19; I18.
