Efficient Conjunctive Keyword-Searchable Encryption

Efficient Conjunctive Keyword-Searchable Encryption
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DOI:
10.1109/ainaw.2007.166
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发表时间:
2007-05
期刊:
21st International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops (AINAW'07)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Eun-Kyung Ryu;T. Takagi
Eun-Kyung Ryu;T. Takagi
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Eun-Kyung Ryu;T. Takagi

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关键字可搜索加密方案允许具有关键字的“陷门”的用户通过远程服务器有效地检索包含特定关键字的一些加密数据。关键字可搜索加密方案被认为是解决许多环境中隐私和数据机密性安全问题的关键构件之一,例如外包数据库系统和邮件(或文件)服务器。然而,大多数现有的计划只支持一个单一的关键字搜索,但不允许关键字的布尔组合。它使得方案在真实的应用中不切实际。为了解决这个问题,我们提出了一个有效的建设合取关键字搜索加密,其中的陷门的大小几乎是相同的搜索一个关键字。我们的建设被证明是安全的,对自适应选择关键字攻击的随机预言机模型下的外部co-Diffie-Hellman假设。与以前的作品相比,我们的建设有更好的性能在计算和通信成本方面。
A keyword-searchable encryption scheme allows a user with a "trapdoor" for a keyword to efficiently retrieve some of encrypted data containing the specific keyword over a remote server. The scheme for keyword-searchable encryption is considered as one of crucial building blocks that solves the security problems of privacy and data confidentiality in many settings, such as outsourced database systems and mail (or file) servers. However, most existing schemes support only a single keyword for searching, but do not allow for boolean combinations of keywords. It makes the use of schemes impractical in real applications. To address this problem, we propose an efficient construction for conjunctive keyword-searchable encryption, in which the size of trapdoors is almost same as that for searching a single keyword. Our construction is proven secure against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks in the random oracle model under the external co-Diffie-Hellman assumption. Compared to previous works, our construction has much better performance in terms of both computational and communication cost.