The Methodological role of Angst in Being and Time
The Methodological role of Angst in Being and Time
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焦虑在《存在与时间》中的方法论作用
DOI：
10.1080/00071773.2012.11006767
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Katherine Withy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Katherine Withy
正如约翰·豪格兰德提醒我们的那样，阅读《存在与时间》（SZ）的主要释经任务之一是解释这本书中关于存在的“存在主义”概念的存在。1除了熟悉的（和不太熟悉的）本体论概念外，海德格尔还讨论了焦虑、死亡、良心、罪恶感和真实性。这些是伦理存在主义概念：它们涉及人类生命的风险和脆弱性，以及我们面对这种情况如何生活。2它们与本体论有什么关系？豪格兰德和其他人的故事讲述了死亡的本体论意义，以及随之而来的真实性、良心和罪恶感。此类故事通常通过将相关风险解释为特定的本体论风险来发挥作用：意义的脆弱性。因此，真实性是应对本体论风险的一种方式。焦虑通常被理解为此类故事的一部分。3这是一种揭示本体论风险的情绪，我们对这种情绪的反应使我们要么真实，要么不真实。在这种阅读中，焦虑属于SZ，因为它与伦理存在主义概念相关。这种解释引起了两个担忧。第一个是文本：海德格尔在第一部分快结束时分析了焦虑，而不是在第二部分中他提出了其他伦理存在主义概念。这个问题有时可以通过富有想象力地移动焦虑的分析并将其视为发生在第二部分来解决。例如，德雷福斯就是这样做的。4虽然这是合法的最后手段，但也许有一种方法可以解释焦虑的分析，从而很好地理解其文本位置。第二个担忧是概念性的：焦虑与道德存在主义概念（尤其是真实性）的关系还远不清楚。尽管海德格尔在分析焦虑时提到了真实性和非真实性，并在第二部分的开头章节中提到了焦虑，但他并没有明确阐明焦虑的伦理存在主义意义。它不能从分析本身直接推断出来。当我们试图理解焦虑与其他伦理存在主义概念的关系时，我们最终会遇到一系列问题。 （我稍后会提到其中一些）。也许还有另一组概念可以更好地理解焦虑。不从伦理存在主义的共鸣出发来处理焦虑可能会有所帮助。海德格尔声称，对焦虑的分析在 SZ 中发挥着方法论的作用（SZ181,182,184,185,190）。我们分析焦虑是因为它与我们一般的生活方式无关，而与我们如何做哲学有关。当海德格尔讨论情绪和
As John Haugeland reminds us, one of the primary exegetical tasks in reading Being and Time (SZ) is to account for the presence of ‘existentialist’ notions in this book about being.1 In addition to familiar (and not so familiar) ontological concepts, Heidegger discusses angst, death, conscience, guilt and authenticity. These are ethical-existentialist concepts: they concern the riskiness and fragility of human life, and how we go about living in the face of this.2 What do they have to do with ontology? Haugeland and others have stories to tell about the ontological significance of death, and with it authenticity, conscience and guilt. Such stories typically work by interpreting the risk in question as a specifically ontological risk: a fragility in meaning. Authenticity is accordingly a way of standing towards ontological risk. Angst is usually understood as part of such a story.3 It is a mood that reveals ontological risk, and our response to this mood makes us either authentic or inauthentic. On this kind of reading, angst belongs in SZ because it is connected to the ethicalexistentialist concepts. This interpretation attracts two worries. The first is textual: Heidegger analyses angst near the end of Division I, and not in Division II where he works out the other ethical-existentialist concepts. This problem is sometimes solved by imaginatively moving the analysis of angst and treating it as if it occurred in Division II. Dreyfus, for example, does this.4 While this is a legitimate last resort, perhaps there is a way to account for the analysis of angst that makes good sense of its textual location. The second worry is conceptual: the relation of angst to the ethicalexistentialist concepts – particularly authenticity – is far from clear. Although Heidegger mentions authenticity and inauthenticity in the analysis of angst, and mentions angst throughout the opening chapters of Division II, he does not clearly spell out the ethical-existentialist significance of angst. It is not straightforwardly deducible from the analysis itself. When we try to understand the relation of angst to the other ethical-existentialist concepts, we end up with a nest of problems. (I mention some of these later). Perhaps there is another set of concepts in terms of which angst is better understood. It might be helpful to approach angst without starting from its ethicalexistentialist resonances. Heidegger claims that the analysis of angst plays a methodological role in SZ (SZ181,182,184,185,190). We analyse angst because it has to do not with how we lead our lives generally, but specifically with how we do philosophy. This is plain when Heidegger discusses moods and