Political Economy of Fairness
Political Economy of Fairness
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公平政治经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
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通讯作者：
E. E. Zajac
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. E. Zajac
政府在干预经济时应如何平衡公平与经济效率的目标？在《公平的政治经济学》一书中，爱德华·扎雅克不仅试图提升公平与经济效率之争的水平，而且还试图说明在执行公平激励的政策时，正确运用经济理论的重要性和困难（最高法院为谢尔曼和克莱顿反托拉斯法赋予意义而进行的斗争就是例证）。他还揭示了政府干预市场的普遍性，以及作为识别和分析政策辩论中主要因素相互作用的组织框架的股东-公平-效率范式的普遍性。公平的政治经济学涵盖了公平理论的主要进展，提供了一个概念和术语的词汇表，将允许更有效和知情的政策沟通。它用清晰的语言解释了这些有时相当困难的概念，最大限度地诉诸直觉，很少数学，并回顾了经济学家的实验工作以及道德哲学家更标准的方法。第一部分着眼于经济学家如何理解和通常定义的概念，效率，成本，价格，退出/进入，外部性，公共产品，企业，风险和激励，以及委托代理理论。第二部分回顾了公平理论，包括约翰·罗尔斯、罗伯特·诺齐克、功利主义和超公平理论的基本要素，以及实验经济学家为发展公平的实证理论所做的大量工作。第三部分涵盖了监管和政府干预的经济理论，介绍了税收的不同概念，市场失灵的“治疗”，公共选择理论和寻租。Zajac通过观察激励相容的监管来结束这一部分，经济学家认为这是政府干预的最有希望的方法。本书以几个案例研究结束，这些案例研究说明了监管和政策中经常出现的主题。案例研究包括累进税、不公平定价（交叉补贴和掠夺性定价和倾销）、合并和收购以及健康、安全和环境监管。
How should the government balance the aims of justice and economic efficiency when intervening in the economy? In Political Economy of Fairness Edward Zajac seeks not only to raise the level of the fairness-economic efficiency debate, but to show both the importance and the difficulty (illustrated by the ongoing struggle of the Supreme Court to put meaning into the Sherman and Clayton antitrust acts) of getting the economic theory right in executing fairness-motivated policy. He also reveals both the pervasiveness of government interference in the marketplace and the generality of the stakeholders-fairness-efficiency paradigm as an organizing framework for identifying and analyzing the interaction of the major elements in the policy debates. Political Economy of Fairness covers the main advances of fairness theory, providing a vocabulary of concepts and terms that will allow more efficient and informed communication about policy. It explains these sometimes quite difficult concepts in clear language with maximum appeal to intuition and little mathematics and reviews the experimental work of economists as well as the more standard approaches of moral philosophers. Part I looks at how economists understand and commonly define the concepts of efficiency, costs, prices, exit/entry, externalities, public goods, firms, risks and incentives, and principal-agent theory. Part II reviews fairness theory, including the basic elements of the theories of John Rawls, Robert Nozick, utilitarianism, and superfairness, and the extensive work of experimental economists to develop positive theories of fairness. Part III covers economic theories of regulation and government intervention, introducing the different concepts of taxation, "cures" for market failures, theories of public choice, and rent seeking. Zajac concludes this part by observing that incentive-compatible regulation appears to economists as the most promising approach to government intervention. The book closes with several case studies that illustrate recurrent themes in regulation and policy. The case studies include progressive taxation, unfair pricing (cross-subsidization and predatory pricing and dumping), mergers and acquisitions, and health, safety, and environmental regulation.