Monetary Policy by Committee : Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority ?
Monetary Policy by Committee : Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority ?
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委员会的货币政策：共识、主席主导还是简单多数？
DOI：
10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.363
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Ruge
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alessandro Riboni;F. Ruge
本文研究了四种不同投票协议下货币政策委员会决策的理论和实证意义。协议是一种共识模式，其中政策改变需要绝对多数;一种议程设置模式，其中主席控制议程;一种独裁者模式，其中主席对委员会拥有绝对权力;以及一种简单多数模式，其中政策由中间成员决定。这些协议突出了实际决策过程的不同方面，并捕捉了中央银行正式程序中观察到的异质性。这些模型是使用加拿大银行、英格兰银行、欧洲中央银行、瑞典央行和美国联邦储备银行这五家中央银行的委员会的利率决定，通过最大似然法进行估计的。对于所有的中央银行，结果表明，共识模型更适合实际的政策决定比替代模型。这表明，尽管存在制度差异，委员会共享不成文的规则和非正式的程序，提供观察等效的政策决定。
This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under four different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where a supermajority is required for a policy change; an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; a dictator model, where the chairman has absolute power over the committee; and a simple majority model, where policy is determined by the median member. These protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision-making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks. The models are estimated by maximum likelihood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. For all central banks, results indicate that the consensus model fits actual policy decisions better than the alternative models. This suggests that despite institutional differences, committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions.