Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
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策略证明分配规则
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0511
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
A. Neme
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Barberà;M. Jackson;A. Neme
我们考虑在与自己的股份相比单一峰值偏好的代理商中分配一项任务或良好股份的问题。以前的特征检查了满足各种对称要求的统一规则，例如统一规则。我们认为代理商可能从最小或最大分配的自然主张开始，或者可能会以不同的优先级对待。我们提供了防策略和高效的规则的特征，但可能会不对称地对待个人。
We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but may treat individuals asymmetrically.