Decentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence from Swiss Cantons
Decentralization and the Productive Efficiency of Government: Evidence from Swiss Cantons
复制标题
权力下放与政府的生产效率：来自瑞士各州的证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.006
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ben Lockwood
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
I. Barankay;Ben Lockwood
财政权力下放的倡导者认为，除其他好处外，它可以提高政府提供服务的效率。本文是第一个评估这一说法的经验之一，通过使用瑞士各州的数据集，研究支出分散化和政府生产效率之间的关联。我们首先提供了仔细的证据，证明支出权力下放是法律的地方自治的有力代表。瑞士各州的进一步面板回归提供了强有力的证据表明，更多的权力下放与更高的教育程度有关。我们还表明，这些收益导致所有教育类型没有负面影响，但男生受益更多的教育权力下放关闭，瑞士的情况下，性别教育差距。
Advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that among other benefits, it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services. This paper is one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between expenditure decentralization and the productive efficiency of government using a data set of Swiss cantons. We first provide careful evidence that expenditure decentralization is a powerful proxy for legal local autonomy. Further panel regressions of Swiss cantons provide robust evidence that more decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment. We also show that these gains lead to no adverse effects across education types but that male students benefited more from educational decentralization closing, for the Swiss case, the gender education gap.