A Strategic Logic of the Military Fait Accompli
A Strategic Logic of the Military Fait Accompli
复制标题
军事既成事实的战略逻辑
DOI：
10.1093/isq/sqw018
复制
发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Ahmer Tarar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ahmer Tarar
在试图改变有利于他们的现状时，领导人有时会突然发动既成事实，涉及代价高昂但有限的军事力量的使用。在这样做时，他们希望潜在的捍卫者接受后果，而不是继续进行进一步的军事冲突。但相对较少的学术研究试图解释这一策略的使用。我从理性主义讨价还价的方法来理解代价高昂的军事冲突，考察了从事既成事实的逻辑。我的分析确定了可能导致领导人采取既成事实的信息和承诺问题，以及可能引发与潜在捍卫者的不必要战争的信息问题。我的模型也适用于扩展威慑的困境；它也为这一领域提供了一些新的见解。总体而言，它有助于解释没有危机讨价还价的战争。
When trying to change the status quo in their favor, leaders sometimes launch sudden faits accomplis involving the costly, but limited, use of military force. In doing so, they hope that the potential defender accepts the consequences and does not pursue further military conflict. But comparatively little scholarship tries to explain the use of this strategy. I examine the logic for engaging in a fait accompli from within the rationalist bargaining approach to understanding costly military conflict. My analysis identifies informational and commitment problems that can cause a leader to undertake a fait accompli , as well as an informational problem under which the fait accompli can trigger an unwanted war with the potential defender. My model also applies to dilemmas of extended deterrence; it provides some new insights into this area as well. Overall, it helps explain wars that are not preceded by crisis bargaining.