“Little kings”: community, change and conflict in Icelandic fisheries

“Little kings”: community, change and conflict in Icelandic fisheries
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“小国王”:冰岛渔业的社区、变化和冲突

DOI:
10.1186/s40152-017-0064-6
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
3.4
通讯作者:
C. Carothers
C. Carothers
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Catherine Chambers;G. Helgadottir;C. Carothers

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政治生态学学者长期以来一直对环境管理中的准入、公平和权力问题感兴趣。本文探讨了这些领域的生活经验和日常现实,在冰岛的渔业社区,30年后实施的国家私有化的个人可转让的渔(ITQ)渔业管理系统。在冰岛西北部的农村沿海社区收集了2年多的人种学数据,我们解决了三个问题:1)ITQ系统如何与当今沿海社区面临的其他复杂的社会和环境因素相关。2)减轻ITQ系统负面影响的尝试如何导致社区出现新的裂痕,以及3)少数主导利益集团在国家政治中的决策权如何使小船渔民和农村社区处于不利地位。用我们的研究参与者的话说,冰岛渔业管理计划在农村社区创造了“小国王”,每个小国王都以自己的最佳利益行事,但没有诉诸集体权力,也没有影响国家政治的平台。在这种具有跨尺度影响的动荡政治局势中,渔民、他们的家庭和社区成员很难想象如何重新分配渔业资源的权力和使用权。
Scholars of political ecology have long been interested in questions of access, equity, and power in environmental management. This paper explores these domains by examining lived experiences and daily realities in Iceland’s fishing communities, 30 years after the implementation of a national privatized Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) fisheries management system. Drawing upon ethnographic data collected over 2 years in the rural coastal communities of Northwest Iceland, we address three questions; 1) How the ITQ system relates to other complex social and environmental factors facing coastal communities today. 2) How attempts to alleviate negative impacts of the ITQ system have led to new rifts in communities and 3) how the decision-making power of a few dominant interest groups in national politics leaves small-boat fishermen and rural communities at a disadvantage. In the words of our study participants, the Icelandic fisheries management scheme has created “little kings” in rural communities, where each little king acts in his own best interest, yet has no recourse to collective power and no platform to influence national politics. In this volatile political situation with cross-scale implications, it is difficult for fishermen, their families, and community members to imagine ways in which power over and access to the fisheries resource can be redistributed.