Belief Merging versus Judgment Aggregation
Belief Merging versus Judgment Aggregation
复制标题
信念合并与判断聚合
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Marquis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Patricia Everaere;S. Konieczny;P. Marquis
聚合来自多个代理的命题信息的问题引起了激烈的研究活动。出现了两种截然不同的理论。一方面，信念合并在人工智能中被认为是信念修正的延伸。另一方面，判断聚合在政治哲学和社会选择理论中得到了发展。判断聚合聚焦于每个智能体都有判断的一些具体问题（以公式表示并聚集成议程），旨在定义一个集体判断集（或一组集体判断集）。信念合并将每个信息源（每个主体的信念基础）视为一个整体，旨在在不考虑议程的情况下定义群体的信念。在这项工作中，当议程完成时（即它包含所有可能的解释），在一般情况和充分知情的情况下研究了两种理论之间的关系。虽然在一般情况下不能确保使用理性信念合并算子计算的集体判断与使用理性判断聚合算子计算的集体判断兼容，但我们表明，当议程完成时，两种理论中考虑的理性属性之间存在一些密切的对应关系。
The problem of aggregating pieces of propositional information coming from several agents has given rise to an intense research activity. Two distinct theories have emerged. On the one hand, belief merging has been considered in AI as an extension of belief revision. On the other hand, judgment aggregation has been developed in political philosophy and social choice theory. Judgment aggregation focusses on some specific issues (represented as formulas and gathered into an agenda) on which each agent has a judgment, and aims at defining a collective judgment set (or a set of collective judgment sets). Belief merging considers each source of information (the belief base of each agent) as a whole, and aims at defining the beliefs of the group without considering an agenda. In this work the relationships between the two theories are investigated both in the general case and in the fully informed case when the agenda is complete (i.e. it contains all the possible interpretations). Though it cannot be ensured in the general case that the collective judgment computed using a rational belief merging operator is compatible with the collective judgment computed using a rational judgment aggregation operator, we show that some close correspondences between the rationality properties considered in the two theories exist when the agenda is complete.