Prime theory: An integrated view of motivation and emotion
Prime theory: An integrated view of motivation and emotion
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基本理论：动机和情感的综合观点
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发表时间：
1985
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通讯作者：
R. Buck
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作者：
R. Buck
动机和情绪被视为一个单一过程的不同方面，其中情绪涉及到层次组织的主要动机/情绪系统（启动）中固有的动机潜力的“读出”。最基本的读数，情绪7，涉及自适应自我平衡功能。在某些物种中，关于某些启动状态的交流变得重要，情感II，包括它们的外在表达，进化而来。随着认知的发展，第三种类型的读出也逐渐形成，即情感III，它涉及到对某些启动子的直接体验。提出了启动与认知相互作用的模型，讨论了语言在人类动机-情感中的独特作用。近年来，与动机和情感分析相关的新信息爆炸式增长，将理论整合的尝试远远抛在了后面。在通常被称为动机的领域，人们越来越认识到，行为可以由外部刺激和认知过程以及作为驱动力减少模型基石的生物缺陷引发。莫根森和菲利普斯（1976）指出，任何当代的动机分析都必须解释基于回报期望的行为（激励动机：宾德拉，1968;博尔斯，1972），以及在自我平衡缺陷发生之前就预见到这些缺陷的适应性行为。动物明显具有预测其需求的反应能力，这表明它们必须使用“在大脑中代表外部世界性质”的过程（Oatley，1973，第12页）。在这篇文章中，我认为，这些过程涉及的现象，传统上已降级到情感领域。动机的主要生理学模型一般都避免了情感的概念，因为它带有主观主义的色彩。这些
Motivation and emotion are viewed as different aspects of a single process in which emotion involves the "readout" of motivational potential inherent in hierarchically organized primary motivational/emotional systems (primes). The most basic readout, Emotion 7, involves adaptive-homeostatic functions. In species where communication about the state of certain primes became important, Emotion II, involving their outward expression, evolved. With cognition, a third type of readout evolved, Emotion III, involving the direct experience of certain primes. A model of the interaction between primes and cognition is presented, and the unique role of language in human motivation-emotion is discussed. In recent years there has been a virtual explosion of new information relevant to the analysis of motivation and emotion that has left attempts at theoretical integration far behind. In the realm usually termed motivation, there has been increasing realization that behavior can be initiated by external stimuli and cognitive processes as well as by the biological deficits that have served as the cornerstone of the drive-reduction model. Mogenson and Phillips (1976) pointed out that any contemporary analysis of motivation must account for behavior based on the expectation of reward (incentive motivation: Bindra, 1968; Bolles, 1972) and for adaptive behavior that anticipates homeostatic deficits before they occur. The apparent ability of animals to make responses that anticipate their needs suggests that they must use processes that "represent within the brain the nature of the outside world" (Oatley, 1973, p. 12). In this article I argue that such processes involve phenomena that have been traditionally relegated to the realm of emotion. The major physiological models of motivation have generally avoided the concept of emotion, with its taint of subjectivism. These