Collective Self Control
Collective Self Control
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集体自我控制
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20150325
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Leeat Yariv
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Lizzeri;Leeat Yariv
行为经济学为仁慈的政府干预提出了一个“家长式”的理论基础。我们考虑的经济中，唯一的“扭曲”是代理人的时间不一致性。我们研究了各种形式的集体行动的可取性，涉及到昂贵的承诺和消费的时间，当政府的决策通过政治过程响应选民的喜好。出现了三个信息。首先，无论是完全集权还是自由放任，福利都是最高的。第二，只对消费决策采取集体行动不会产生任何承诺。最后，个体对承诺的相对偏好可能会逆转，这取决于未来的消费决策是否集中。
Behavioral economics presents a "paternalistic" rationale for a benevolent government's intervention. We consider an economy where the only "distortion" is agents' time-inconsistency. We study the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining to costly commitment and ones pertaining to the timing of consumption, when government decisions respond to voters' preferences via the political process. Three messages emerge. First, welfare is highest under either full centralization or laissez-faire. Second, introducing collective action only on consumption decisions yields no commitment. Last, individuals' relative preferences for commitment may reverse depending on whether future consumption decisions are centralized or not.