An Efficient Cross-Layer Authentication Scheme for Secure Communication in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
An Efficient Cross-Layer Authentication Scheme for Secure Communication in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
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DOI：
10.1109/tvt.2023.3244077
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发表时间：
2023-07
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
M. Shawky;M. Bottarelli;G. Epiphaniou;P. Karadimas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Shawky;M. Bottarelli;G. Epiphaniou;P. Karadimas
智能交通系统通过促进车辆和基础设施之间的实时通信，有助于改善交通安全。在这种情况下，消息验证对于保护车载自组织网络（vanet）免受恶意攻击至关重要。目前VANETs中最先进的身份验证依赖于传统的加密原语，引入了大量的计算和通信开销。本文提出了一种车载通信跨层认证方案，利用无线信道的短期互易特性对相应终端进行重新认证，降低了整体复杂度和计算及通信开销。建议的方案包括四个步骤：上层认证用于确定对应终端在第一个时隙的合法性；S2。根据验证结果，在两个终端之间提取不匹配位数最少的位置相关共享密钥；S3。利用提取的密钥，在二元假设检验条件下，提出了一种用于多载波通信的PHY挑战-响应算法进行重认证；S4。在检测错误的情况下，根据重新认证步骤S3的反馈，调整不同信道非互易条件下的量化水平后，重新执行密钥提取步骤S2。仿真结果表明，即使在较小的信噪比下，该方法也是有效的。此外，还证明了该方案对主动和被动攻击的免疫力，包括签名对随机oracle模型中自适应选择消息攻击的不可伪造性。最后，在计算和通信开销方面进行了全面的比较，证明了该方案优于其最佳竞争对手。
Intelligent transportation systems contribute to improved traffic safety by facilitating real-time communication between vehicles and infrastructures. In this context, message authentication is crucial to safeguard vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) from malicious attacks. The current state-of-the-art for authentication in VANETs relies on conventional cryptographic primitives, introducing significant computation and communication overheads. This paper presents a cross-layer authentication scheme for vehicular communication, incorporating the short-term reciprocal features of the wireless channel for re-authenticating the corresponding terminal, reducing the overall complexity and computation and communication overheads. The proposed scheme comprises four steps: S1. Upper-layer authentication is used to determine the legitimacy of the corresponding terminal at the first time slot; S2. Upon the verification result, a location-dependent shared key with a minimum number of mismatched bits is extracted between both terminals; S3. Using the extracted key and under binary hypothesis testing, a PHY challenge-response algorithm for multicarrier communication is proposed for re-authentication; S4. In the case of false detection, the key extraction step (S2) is re-executed after adapting the quantisation levels at different conditions of channel non-reciprocity based on the feedback from the re-authentication step (S3). Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme even at small signal-to-noise ratios. In addition, the immunity of the proposed scheme is proved against active and passive attacks, including signatures' unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle model. Finally, a comprehensive comparison in terms of computation and communication overheads demonstrates the superiority of the proposed scheme over its best rivals.