THE TELEOLOGICAL NOTION OF FUNCTION
THE TELEOLOGICAL NOTION OF FUNCTION
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DOI：
10.1080/00048409112344881
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发表时间：
1991-12-01
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
NEANDER, K
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
NEANDER, K
企鹅在陆地上是近视的，这对企鹅来说是正常的;这是光学系统的副产品，其主要功能是在企鹅找到食物的水下提供锐利的视觉焦点。这个熟悉的“函数”（或“真函数”，因为它也被称为）的概念有两个非常有趣的特点。它是规范性的--有一个正常运作的标准，实际的特征可以偏离这个标准。这是目的论的--企鹅的眼睛在水下提供锐利的视觉聚焦的功能解释了为什么企鹅有他们的眼睛，为什么他们有陆地近视，通过解释他们特殊的光学系统。这篇论文主要关注的是：正当功能如何产生目的论的解释;为什么病因学理论是理解概念这一特征的正确方法;为什么倾向论是错误的方法，这与约翰·毕格罗和罗伯特·帕吉特在他们关于这一主题的论文[3]中的主张相反。我们主要想了解的是，生物学上的“适当功能”概念如何既能在目的论上又能在科学上得到尊重。今天，人们普遍认为这两件事都是如此，但通过文献检索发现，只有失败的尝试来解释这一事实。1.我在这里的目的是澄清事实。在本文中，我将不直接涉及功能规范，尽管在其他地方[17，19]我已经论证过功能规范也需要一个功能的病因学理论。密立根[22]，格里菲斯[10]和我[17，19]在其他地方也回答了各种标准的反对病因理论。2
Penguins are myopic on land and this is normal for penguins; it is a byproduct of an optical system that has the primary function of providing sharp visual focus under water where the penguins find their food. This familiar notion of'function'(or'proper function'as it is also called) has two very interesting features. It is normative--there is a standard of proper functioning from which actual traits can diverge. And it is teleological--the function of the penguins' eyes of providing sharp visual focus under water explains why the penguins have the eyes they have, and why they have land myopia, by explaining what their particular optical system/s for. At least it appears to do so.This paper is mainly concerned with how proper functions generate teleological explanations; why an etiological theory is the right way to understand this feature of the notion; and why the propensity theory is the wrong way, contrary to the claims of John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter in their paper on the topic [3]. What we principally want to understand is how the biological notion of'a proper function'can be both teleological and scientifically respectable. Today it is generally accepted that it is both these things, but a search back through the literature reveals only failed attempts to account for the fact. 1 I aim here to set the record straight. I will not be directly concerned with functional norms in this paper, although in other places [17, 19] I have argued that functional norms also require an etiological theory of functions. Millikan [22], Griffiths [10] and I [17, 19] have elsewhere also replied to the various standard objections to etiological theories. 2