Durable Good, Extended Warranty and Channel Coordination
Durable Good, Extended Warranty and Channel Coordination
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DOI：
10.2202/1546-5616.1004
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发表时间：
2004-01
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Preyas S. Desai;Paddy Padmanabhan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Preyas S. Desai;Paddy Padmanabhan
关于产品保修和延长保修的营销文献主要集中在它们在规避风险的消费者市场中作为细分工具的作用。在保留这一保险理论的基础上，我们强调了延长保修在渠道协调中的作用，并从传统的消费者效用模型中推导出了耐用品和延长保修的明确需求函数。这种推导明确地捕捉到了扩展保修的互补商品风味。然后，我们研究了市场上常见的不同分销安排对市场结果和制造商盈利能力的影响。我们发现，两个关键的力量驱动的结果-互补品效应和双重边缘化效应。不同的渠道安排，延长保修的营销导致这些影响发生在不同层次的分销渠道内，这些都被证明有显着的影响，最优的保修政策。
The marketing literature on product warranty and extended warranty has largely focused on their role as segmentation instruments in risk-averse consumer markets. Preserving this insurance rationale, we highlight the role of extended warranty in channel coordination.We derive explicit demand functions for the durable good and extended warranty from a traditional model of consumer utility. This derivation explicitly captures the complementary goods flavor of extended warranty. We then investigate the impact of different distributional arrangements commonly observed in the marketplace for market outcomes and manufacturer profitability. We show that two key forces drive the results-the complementary goods effect and the double marginalization effect. Different channel arrangements for marketing of extended warranty cause these effects occur at different levels within a distribution channel and these are shown to have significant implications for the optimal warranty policy.